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MISPRISION OF A FEDERAL FELONY: DANGEROUS 
RELIC OR SCOURGE OF MALFEASANCE? 
Royal G. ShannoDhouse, IUt 
The federal crime of misprision of felony exists in the face of 
interpretive, enforcement and constitutional problems. This 
peculiar crime is analyzed in terms of its elements, related 
crimes and defenses. The author concludes that misprision of 
felony should not be permitted to continue in its present form. 
I. THE CRIME ANALYZED 
Origin and Purpose 
It seems a bit extreme to say that "there is and always has been an 
offense of misprision of felony ,"I but it is true enough for all but the 
pedant, the crime being in existence for over 700 years and known by 
its present name since 1557.2 The crime first found its way into United 
States law in 1790,3 and has been re-enacted twice4 without substantial 
change since then. Misprision, a felony,S is now defined as follows: 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commisSion of a 
felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and 
does not as soon as possible make known the same to some 
judge or other person in civil or military authority under the 
United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned 
not more than three years, or both.6 
By 1934 this federal crime had appeared "before the courts but 
twice in the 144 years of its life'" and today may be found in less than 
two dozen cases. The punishment prescribed remains virtually un-
changed since 1790.8 A string of federal misprision cases between 1966 
t J. D .• 1955. University of North Carolina; Professor of Law. University of Baltimore School of 
Law,I969-. . 
1. Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961]3 All E.R. 33. 40 (H.L.l. 
2. Id. at 36-37. 
3. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §6, 1 Stat. 113. Misprision· of treason, beyond the scope of this 
article: was also made a punishable offense. Id. §2, 1 Stat. 112. 
4. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684, amending 18 U.S.C. §251 (1940) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §4, (1970)); Act of March 4. 1909, ch. 321, §146. 35 Stat. 1114. 
5. "Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary: (1) Any offense punishable by 
death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is a felony." 18 U.S.C. §1 (1970). 
6. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
7. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795,797 (1Oth Cir. 1934). 
8. Originally, the misprisioner was to be "imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined 
. not exceeding five hundred dollars." Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §6, 1 Stat. 113. In 1909, 
this was changed to: "fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more 
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and 19719 denies the obsolescence of the crime (at least in the Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits) and the corruption scandals known 
collectively as "Watergate" should produce a renewed interest in this 
ancient offense. 
The purpose of the federal misprision statute is presumably the same 
as that of its common law ancestor: to encourage citizens to report 
serious crimes so as to facilitate the suppression thereof.· 0 Although it 
may shock many United. States citizens to learn that there is a law-im-
posed duty to inform the government of the misconduct of one's 
fellows, the obligation of the citizen to do so is neither new nor 
anomalous. Such reports for over 100 years have been protected against 
discovery as privileged communications.· 1 The citizen-informer's right 
to protection against violence for giving such information "arises out of 
the creation and establishment by the constitution itself of a national 
government, paramount and supreme within its sphere of action.". 2 
The duty to inform must derive from the same sourc.e. That there is 
such a duty is. the clear implication of the statute itself .• 3 
Perhaps a more satisfactory rationale for a statute compelling ordi-
nary citizens to become police informers is that the "peace of the 
United States". 4 is secured to all of the people thereof by the law and 
that a government of, by and for the people tneans a government in 
which the people actively participate in the ~nforcement of the laws .• 5 
The Elements-Felony 
A federal misprisioner must have "knowledge of the actual commis-
sion of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States .... ". 6 
than three years, or both." Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §146, 35 Stat. 114. The 
punishment remains the same today. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
9. United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Daddano. 432 F.2d 
1119 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Norman, 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968); Sullivan v. 
United States, 411 F.2d 556 (lOth Cir. 1969); United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th 
Cir. 1968); Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 
(1966). 
10. Ever since the day of hue and cry, it has been the duty of a man who knows that 
a felony has been committed to report it to the proper authority so that steps can 
be taken to apprehend the felon and bring him to justice. 
Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961]3 All E.R. 33 n.1 (H.L.,. 
11. Vogel v. Gruaz, 100 U.S. 311 (1884); United States v. Rogers. 53 F.2d 874 (D.N.J. 1931); 
Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872). 
12. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895). 
13. "To inform is a statutory duty. ; .. " United States v. Rogers, 53 F.2d 874,' 876 
<D.N.J.1931). Defendants' "duty to notify" was held nullified by the Fifth Amendment in 
United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1971). 
14. "That there is a peace of the United States ... [is] too clear to need argument to prove 
[it]." In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1,69 (1890). 
15. It is the duty and the right ... of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in 
securing the punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States .... It 
is likewise his right and his duty to communicate to the executive officers any in-
formation which he has of the commission of an offense against those laws .... 
In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895). 
16. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
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Concealment of a misdemeanor is not punishable under this law.l 7 The 
classification of the principal offense at the time of its commission 
determines whether its concealment is misprision, not the classification 
at the time of concealment or nondisclosure.l 8 
Felonies subject to misprision include all violations of federal law 
which are punishable by "death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year."l9 Misprisionable felonies presumably include all offenses 
upon federal reservations which are felonies according to the law of the 
surrounding state;l 0 But misprision of a crime declared felony by state 
law is not subject to prosecution in a federal court unless it did occur 
upon a federal reservation or is also declared to be a felony by federal 
law.l1 
When one considers that, under federal law, an assault "by ... 
wounding" is only a misdemeanor,22 while one who "knowingly and 
fraudulently makes a false oath ... in relation to any bankruptcy 
proceeding" is guilty of a felony,l3 the limitation of misprision to 
felonies seems questionable. If one further contemplates that state laws 
classify many serious crimes as misdemeanors and many relatively petty 
17. Presont v. United States, 281 F.131 (6th Cir. 1922); United States v. Venturini, 1 F. Supp. 
213 (S.D. Ala. 1931). ' 
18. If the principal act, the concelilment and the nondisclosure all occurred before the 
principal act was classified a felony, the misprision stature would not apply, because what 
was concealed was not a felony. It seems equally clear that if the principal act was no 
crime or only a misdemeanor when committed, was subsequently classified a felony, and 
then the concealment and nondisclosure thereof occurred, there would still be no 
misprision because there would be no "actual commission of a felony." by the principal. It 
is hornbook law that wrongful acts are subject to prosecution only according to the law in 
force at the time of the act and that neither the nature of the crime nor its punishment 
may be changed with retroactive effect. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9; See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(3 Da11.) 386, 390 (1798) (dictum). If the principal is not subject to prosecution for a 
felony, then one who concealed his crime should not be guilty of misprision. 
19. 18 U.S.C. §l (1970). Some felonies which currently seem particularly subject to 
misprision include:.id. §201 (bribery); id. §610 (willfully accepting an illegal contribution 
to a Presidential election campaign); id. §1505 (trying to influence witness in any 
Congressional inquiry); id. §1510 (trying to prevent information reaching any federal 
criminal investigator); id. §§1621, 1623 (perjury); id. §1622 (subornation of perjury); id. 
01902 (illegal disclosure of crop information); id. §2071 (concealing, mutilating or 
destroying records or documents flied or deposited in any public office). 
20. Whoever within [the jurisdiction of the United States as defined in 18 U.S.C. §13 
(1970) I is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any 
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the 
jurisdiction of the State ... in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in 
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and sub-
ject to a like punishment. 
18 U.S.C. §I3 (1970). This law applies to crimes defmed by state law subsequent to its 
enactment by Congress. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (t958). 
21. See United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944). 
22. "Whoever ... is guilty of an assault shall be punishable as follows: ... (d) Assault by 
striking, beating, or wounding, by fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not 
more than three months, or both." 18 U.S.C. §113 (1970). Any offense punishable by 
imprisonment for one year or less is a misdemeanor.ld. §1(2). 
23. This offense is punishable by fine of not more than $5000 or imprisonment for not more 
than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §1(52) (1970). A felony is a crime punishable by a term 
exceeding one year. ld. §1(1). 
62 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4 
offenses as felonies,24 the limitation of misprision to felonies seems 
indefensible. 
Misprision,. as so limited, fails to serve the community need for 
protection and the purpose for which it was created, to the extent that 
it is inapplicable to those who conceal and fail to make known the 
commission of serious offenses which happen to be classified as mis-
demeanors. Furthermore, to the extent that it makes one punishable 
for concealing and failing to disclose relatively petty offenses, it dis-
courages vigorous enforcement. Finally, to the extent that this law 
provides a punishment for concealing and failing to report that which 
the ordinary citizen would not think serious enough to merit the 
attention of the police, it is unfaifl 5 and could be an unconstitutional 
violation of a citizen's right to due process of law. 2 6 
A better classification of crimes subject to misprision would seem to 
be one which would include only those "of so serious a character that 
an ordinary law-abiding citizen would realize he ought to report it to 
the police.,,2 7 Reasonable minds might well differ on which crimes to 
include and which to exclude from the category of misprision able 
offenses and it may well be that only a catalog of specifically mis-
prisionable offenses will serve the purpose of this law. 
Knowledge 
The federal misprision statute requires that one have "knowledge of 
the actual commission of a felony .... "2 II Knowledge has been defined 
as, "the fact or condition of knowing something with a considerable 
degree of familiarity gained through experience of or contact or associa-
tion with the individual or thing so known.,,2 9 Obviously, participation 
in a crime or being an eyewitness of it would give one "knowledge of 
the actual commission" of the crime. At the opposite extreme, unveri-
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. I, §7 (1960) (defining felony); id. tit. 14, §34 (1959) 
(horsewhipping a person while armed with a deadly weapon: misdemeanor); id. §87 
(breaking into an automobile to steal: felony); id. §§320, 322 (involuntary manslaughter: 
misdemeanor); id. §354 (beating a person to force a confession of guilt: misdemeanor); id. 
§357 (self-mutilation to gain sympathy: felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-61 (1972) 
(willfully causing physical injury to another person: misdemeanor); id. §53a-l03 
(entering or remaining unlawfully in a building-not a dwelling-with intent to commit a 
crime therein: felony); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 451 (1965) (defining felony); id. tit. 
17,§101 (adultery: felony); id. §451 (blasphemy: felony); id. §l055 (vivisection and 
experimenting upon a living animal in a public school: misdemeanor); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
27, §388 (Supp. 1973) (manslaughter by grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle: 
misdemeanor); id. art. 81, §455 (1969) (transporting non-taxpaid cigarettes: felony). 
25 ... [A) law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average 
member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear." O. W. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). 
26. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957), wherein it was said: "Where a 
person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability 
of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process." 
27. Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961)3 All E.R. 33, 42 (H.L.). 
28. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
29. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1966). 
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fied information obtained from one who was not involved in the crime 
would not give knowledge (as defined above) of the crime. The point 
between these extremes at which information becomes knowledge, 
within the meaning of the statute, may be described as the point at 
which hearsay is supplemented by direct observati,on of facts which 
tend to corroborate the hearsay. 30 
This concept of the knowledge required for guilt of misprision is not 
only appealingly practical, it is also consistent with the common law3 1 
and with the policy of encouraging citizen participation in law enforce-
ment by punishing those who fail to report what they have reason to 
believe is a serious crime.3 2 
It seems to be settled that knowledge does not include erroneous 
belief, however sincerely a person may think that he is concealing a 
felony.33 Knowledge of "the actual commission of a felony" means 
that what the principal did must have been a felony, not a misde-
meanor.34 Thus a person who believes that a felony has been com-
mitted and thinks he knows who committed it, who fails to disclose the 
facts in his possession, and who acts to conceal evidence of the crime, is 
not guilty of misprision if he happens to be wrong about the classifica-
tion of the principal offense. 
Three cases have implied that ignorance that the principal's conduct 
is classified by law as a felony would be a defense· to prosecution for 
misprision.35 It is submitted that the defense of ignorance should be 
30. In United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694,695 (9th Cir. 1968), three people discussed r~bbing 
a certain bank in the presence of the defendant. The next day, defendant heard a radio 
. report that the bank had been robbed. The same three people told defendant that one of 
them had robbed the bank and one of them gave the defendant some of the money; the 
defendant accompanied two of them to another's apartment to get transportation out of 
town. Although reversing defendant's conviction of misprision on other grounds, the court 
discussed the elements nec~sary for conviction and concluded that defendant had "full 
knowledge" of the principals' felony. See also Ormsby v. United States, 273 F. 977 (6th 
Cir. 1921), where one who, on the· basis of uncorroborated hearsay, reported that another 
had committed a felony was sued for libel and the duty to report felonies was held to be no 
defense to the allegation of malice. 
31. "[T]here must be evidence that a reasonable man in his place, with such facts and 
information before him as the accused had, would have known that a felony had been 
committed." Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961] 3 All E.R. 33,41 (H.L.) 
(after reviewing common law authorities). 
32. "Misprision comprehends an offense which is of so serious a character that an ordinary 
law-abiding citizen would realize he ought to report it to the police." [d. at 42. 
33. See United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944), knowingly harboring an 
interstate fugitive from state felony prosecution held not misprision .because the state 
crime was not one within the contemplation of the federal Fugitive Felon Act; United 
States v. Chapman, 3 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Ala. 1931), where knowingly receiving and 
concealing proceeds of embezzlement held not misprision because the principal's offense 
was construed by the court to be a misdemeanor, notwithstanding that under 18 U.S.C. §1 
(1970) it would be a felony. 
34. United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944); United States v. Presont, 281 
F. 131 (6th Cir. 1922); United States v. Chapman, 3 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Ala. 1931); 
United States v. Venturini, 1 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ala. 1931). 
35. In Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643,646 (8th Cir. 1939), a conviction of misprision was 
reversed for insufficient evidence of the act of concealment. The court enumerated the 
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rejected unequivocally. Apart from the ancient maxim, ignorantia juris, 
quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat,,,3 6 it seems fair enough 
that knowledge that conduct is criminal should carry with it the burden 
of ascertaining whether it is within the category of offenses the conceal-
ment of which is a crime. In other words, one who knows that he 
conceals another's crime surely should do so at the peril that it is 
classified a felony. 
Whether knowledge of the identity of the principal felon is a pre-
requisite to conviction is an open question. Whether it is required as a 
matter of law, no case has been found in which a misprision defendant 
did not in fact know the identity of the principal. Perhaps for this 
reason, at least one court has implied that knowledge of the identity of 
the felon is an element of misprision.3 7 
The statute on its face does not compel this interpretation, and it is 
submitted that knowledge of the identity of the felon should not be an 
element of misprision. If a bank customer, for example, concealed 
evidence relevant to the apprehension and prosecution of bank robbers, 
such as the note demanding money, and failed to report finding such 
evidence, there seems little doubt that such person should be deemed 
guilty of misprision, without proof that he was aware of the identity of 
the felons. . 
Eliminating knowledge of the identity of the principals as an element 
of misprision would not make otherwise innocent bystanders guilty of 
misprision for failing to report the commission of a federal felony by 
strangerS, if they made no effort to conceal the crime or evidence 
thereof, because an affirmative act of concealment is an essential 
element of the offense.3 !! Indeed, to convict bystanders for failure to 
report a federal felony committed openly, without other act of partici-
pation on their part, would almost certainly be unconstitutional.3 9 
elements of the crime as including: (1) that "the principal, had committed and completed 
the felony;" and (2) that "the defendant had full knowledge of that fact." This statement 
was later adopted in United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1968) (dictum) and 
followed in Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 
(1966). 
36. "Ignorance of the law, which every one is presumed to know, excuses no one." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 881 (4th ed. 1968). This "is as well the maxim of our own law, as it was of 
the Roman." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ·27. 
37. In Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1966), the court emphasized 
that, upon the happening of a certain event, "any lack of certain knowledge as to ... who 
had committed [the felony] was laid to rest" and "we find clear and substantial evidence 
that [defendant] was proved to have knowledge of ... the identity of the perpetra-
tor .. .. " 
38. See p. 66 infra. 
39. [Aln indictment must allege something more than mere failure to disclose-
some affirmative act of concealment, such as suppression of the evidence, 
harboring of the cril;ninal, intimidation of witnesses, or other positive act designed 
to conceal from the authorities the fact that a crime had been committed. 
Furthermore, some such interpretation is necessary to rescue the act from an 
intolerable oppressiveness and to eliminate a serious question of constitutional 
power .... The bystander who saw a federal felony committed would become a 
felon if he did not promptly report it, although federal officers apprehended the 
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Conceals 
It is well established that the phrase in the mispnslOn statute, 
"conceals and does not as soon as possible make known'''' 0 creates two 
distinct elements of the crime of misprision; and that "conceals" means 
a positive act intended to prevent discovery of the felony or to hinder 
its prosecution.41 The act need not be successful in concealing the 
felony in order to be punishable. (Indeed, the act must have failed to 
do so, as the Government must prove the commission of the felony as 
an element of misprision.)4 2 
With respect to what does constitute a positive act of concealment, 
the courts have not created a mOdel of consistency or clarity or 
formulated a dermition of the word "conceals" in the context of the 
statute. 
A misprision indictment has been laid on evidence that the accused 
merely received and kept embezzled funds with intent to aid the 
principal in avoiding detection and arrest;43 but the Ninth Circuit has 
held that merely receiving part of the proceedS of a bank robbery is not 
an affinnative act of concealment,44 while the Tenth has held that 
knowingly receiving and spending bank robbery loot supports a convic-
tion for misprision.4 5 
A Ninth Circuit dictum states that if part of the proceeds of a bank 
robbery was paid to a person to buy his silence and such pe.rson "had 
this purpose in mind in receiving the money," then "the receipt of the 
money ... would be an affirmative act fulfilling the fourth essential 
element of misprision.'''' 6 The Tenth Circuit reached the diametric 
conclusion, saying that "consideration paid [i.e., received] is the 
motive for, and not an act of, concealment!'" 7 
It would seem that the bare act of knowingly receiving stolen money 
or goods is no more an act of concealment of the theft than the bare 
act of knowingly purchasing contraband is a concealment of thesale.4 II 
criminal on the spot .... An interpretation leading to such an intolerable conclu-
sion should not lightly be imputed. 
Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795. 797 (1Oth Cir. 1934). 
40. 18 U.S.C. 14 (1970). 
41. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970); Lancey v. United States, 356 
F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 
(8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941); Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d795 
(lOth Cir. 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515 (D. Mass.), affd, 281 U.S. 624 
(1930). 
42. See pp. 61-63 supra. 
43. United States v. Chapman, 3 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Ala. Hl31), where a demurrer to the 
indictment was sustained upon a finding that the principal's offense was a misdemeanor. 
44. United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968). 
45. Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556 (lOth Cir. 1969). 
46. United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1968). 
47. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 798 (lOth Cir. 1934). 
48. See United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515 (D. Mass.), affd, 281 U.S. 624 (l930), where an 
indictment for purchasing illegal liquor was quashed as not within the intent of Congress 
in enacting the National Prohibition Act and as not charging a misprision because 
co 1m jere silence after knowledge of. the commission of the crime is not sufficient." 
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Furthennore, if merely receiving stolen goods were an act of conceal-
ment within the misprision statute, then anyone knowingly receiving 
stolen goods and failing to report his supplier would simultaneously be 
guilty of misprision and immune from prosecution for it, under his 
Fifth Amendment protection against prosecution for failing to reveal 
self-incriminating infonnation to the authorities.4 9 
Whether a person who obtained possession of evidence of a felony 
concealed it, within the meaning of the misprision statute, would seem 
logically to depend upon what he did with it. Examples of conduct 
with respect to such evidence that would indicate an intent to prevent 
it falling into the hands of the authorities (thus a concealment) would 
be altering stolen goods to disguise their identity, hiding money to 
avoid its detection until the search for it had waned, transporting stolen 
money from the place of the crime so as to prevent its detection when 
spent, et cetera. 
Silencing a felony witness by murder, intimidation or bribery 
would seem to be a positive act intended to conceal the felony or to 
hinder its prosecution, thus to satisfy the concealment element of 
misprision.s 0 
The following have been held to be affinnative acts of concealment: 
giving lie detector tests to members of a gang to discourage cooperation 
with police;s 1 registering in a hotel and sharing the room with a known 
fugitive felonf 2 illegally obtaining automobile registration plates and 
placing them upon a stolen vehicle.s 3 
The foregoing analysis of the cases somewhat tenuously supports the 
conclusion that any intentional act which destroyss 4 or concealss S 
physical evidence of a federal felony, or conceals the felon,s 6 or 
intimidatesS 7 or bribess 8 witnesses satisfies the concealment element 
of misprision. 
In the context of the misprision statute,S 9 the courts have not 
49. See p. 68 infra. This point was recognized by the dissenting judge in United States v. 
King, 402 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1968), who pointed out that "one knowingly receiving 
and keeping any type of stolen property could employ the suggested constitutional shield 
and thus prevent prosecution under" the misprision statute. 
50. See note 39 supra. The one sentence in United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 798 (3d 
Cir. 1942), to the effect that the indictment for conspiracy to influence and intimidate 
grand jury witnesses to testify falsely "does not charge or attempt to charge misprision of 
felony," meant only that the defendants in that case were in fact indicted for conspiracy 
(for which their conviction was affirmed) and not for misprision. 
5!. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
52. United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
53. United States v. Norman, 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968). 
54. At least in the sense of disposing of the evidence by spending it. See Sullivan v. United 
States, 411 F.2d 556 (lOth Cir. 1969). 
55. Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (l966). In the 
sense of disguising the identity of a stolen vehicle by putting illegally obtained license 
plates on it, see United States v. Norman, 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968), 
56. United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
57. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
58. If misprision may be committed by intimidating a felony witness, it would seem to follow, 
a fortiori, that bribing would suffice. 
59. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
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interpreted the word "conceal" to mean "to prevent disclosure or 
recognition of," as Webster's60 has it, but to mean merely an act 
intended to have that effect.6 1 Thus the statute appears to have been 
judicially amended to include an attempt as a punishable misprision. 
But it is submitted that what thus appears to be judicial legislation is 
defensible on two grounds. First, misprision does not require conceal-
ment permanently. An attempted concealment may be a successful 
concealment, temporarily. Second, the courts' interpretation fits the 
secondary meanings of conceal, that is, "to place out of sight; withdraw 
from being observed; shield from vision or notice."6 2 
When the foregoing meanings are employed, misprision becomes the 
act of one who, having knowledge of a felony, places evidence of it or 
the felon himself out of sight, withdraws either from being observed, or 
shields them from vision or notice. It follows that "whether the 
government did or did not. know of the crime or who the perpetrator 
was is unimportant,,63 ina prosecution for misprision. ''The pertinent 
matter is whether the defendant made the information known to a 
judge or other authority.,,6 4 
Whether an unsuccessful attempt to bribe or intimidate a felony 
witness into silence would be deemed a sufficient concealment for 
misprision-quaere.6s On the one hand it would seem that such an 
affirmative act intended to conceal the felony or to hinder its investiga-
tion and prosecution would be analogous to the act of unsuccessfully 
concealing physical. evidence,6 6 or the felon.67 On the other hand, 
unsuccessfully concealing physical evidence or the felon does "place 
out of sight; withdraw from being observed; shield' from vision or 
notice" thus "conceal;" while an unsuccessful attempt to bribe or 
intimidate a witness does not do so. This problem could be readily 
eliminated by the addition of an attempt to the definition of mis-
prision.68 
Does Not Make Known 
An essential element of the federal crime of misprision is that a 
person "does not as soon as possible make known the [felony] to some 
judge or otil:er person in civil or military authority .... "69 All of the 
60. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATlON~L DICTIONARY 469 (1966). 
61. In none of the misprision cases cited in this article was the accused successful in 
permanently preventing disclosure of what he was trying to conceal. 
62. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 469 (1966). 
63. Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1966). 
64. United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42, 44 (E.D.N.Y 1959). 
65. In the only witness-intimidation misprl!!ion case found, the defendant's effort was 
apparently successful. See United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). No 
misprision case involving the bribery of a felony witness has been found. 
66. United States v. Norman, 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968). 
67. Lancey v. United States, 356 F .2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); United 
States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42 (1959). 
68. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
89.Id. 
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known federal misprision convictions have involved defendants who 
failed to do anything to disclose the crime. Consequently, no court 
decision has been found which defines the phrase, "does not ... 
make known," or which prescribes the manner of fulfilling the statu-
tory duty to report. 7 0 
Whether an ineffective attempt to communicate the information 
would be a good defense to prosecution for misprision is therefore an 
9pen question. On the one hand, such an attempt would not make 
known the felony to' the authorities, as required by the statute; but on 
the other hand, the effort to comply with the law and the absence of 
criminal intent would seem to make punishment unjust. 
The courts have held that "conceals" and "does not ... make 
known" are two discrete elements of misprision and that both are 
required for conviction,7 1 except when the Fifth Amendment elimi-
nates the duty to disclose incriminating information.7 2 Therefore, 
without strict liability for failure to make known the commission of a 
felony, an ineffective attempt to disclose the fact of the crime to the 
authorities would be a defense to one who had willfully concealed 
evidence thereof. The opportunity for an accessory of a felon to escape 
conviction of misprision is obvious. Whether the risk of such an evasion 
of justice should be met by imposing strict liability for failure to make 
known effectively or, rather, by merely imposing upon an accused the 
burden of proving that he made a bona fide effort to communicate his 
information to the authorities, is a question of policy which should be 
resolved' by Congress or the judiciary . 
It is submitted that the question should be resolved in favor of strict 
liability. The number of authorities to \l\'ho!Il the crime may be re-
ported ("some ... person in civil or, military authority under the 
United States") and the ubiquity of modern communications make 
compliance a simple matter. While fear of immediate harm might justify 
a delay in reporting a felony, 7 3 fear of retaliation by the principal is 
almost certainly no defense to one who failed to report when it was 
possible to do so without immediate danger. 7 4 Furthermore, anyone 
fearful of retaliation by the principaJ felon might make his report 
anonymously and then, if defense of prosecution for misprision became 
necessary, identify hims~lf as the informant by his knowledge of the 
time, place and manner in which the report was made. 
In the rare case in which a mispriSion defendant had in fact made a 
bona fide but ineffective attempt to report to the authorities and then 
70. "To inform is a statutory duty .... " United States v. Rogers, 53 F.2d 874, 876 (D.N.J. 
1931). 
71. Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941). 
72. United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1971). 
73. See Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1966); p. 70 infra. 
74. In Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1966), the court pointed out that if 
fear of the principal were a defense to misprision, "there seldom could be a conviction." 
Analogously, fear induced by threats upon one's life is no defense to prosecution for failure 
to appear in court for trial. United States v. Eley, 480 F.2d 617 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 480 
F.2d 925 (1973); United States v. Miller, 451 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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was caught before he had another opportunity to make his information 
known, he should have an appealing plea to the mercy of the court. 
As Soon As P088ible 
When Congress rewrote the earlier misprision statute 7 5 they changed 
the time within which the report of a felony is to be made from "as 
soon as may be" to "as soon as possible." No explanation of congres-
sional intent in making this change has been found. 
In a case arising under the statute as formerly worded, 7 6 the court 
pointed out that, while the accused had told the investigating authori-
ties all he knew about his principal's wrongdoing and the location of 
evidence thereof after he had been frightened into doing so by the 
federal officers who were investigating the crime, he might have done so 
several days earlier than that, after his principal had fled the premises. 
A case decided after the statute was amended, which addresses the. 
issue of time within which the report is to be made is Lancey u. United 
States. 77 The defendant's conviction of misprision was affirmed over 
his protest that he did not report because he was afraid of the principal 
felon, the harboring of whom was one of the acts of misprision for 
which he was convicted. While the court neither accepted nor rejected 
fear or duress as a defense for failing to make known to the authorities 
information about a felony, 7 8 it went on to enumerate the several op-
portunities that the defendant had to notify the authorities when the 
principal felon was away from the defendant's house. The court em-
phasized "that he failed to notify the civil authorities when he had the 
opportunity to do so .... "79 
These two cases seem to support the conclusion that the courts view 
the change in the wording of the statute as not changing the meaning; 
and that the change was intended merely to emphasize that the duty to 
report a felony is to be performed at the first opportunity to do so 
without risk of immediate harm; but that no penalty is to be imposed 
for a failure to accomplish the impossible. 
Conceals and Does Not Make KnC)wn 
The conjunctive terms of the misprision statute8 .O and the unani-
mous opinions of federal judges in six jurisdictions from 1930 to 
75. . Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of the crime of murder or 
other felony cognizable by the courts of the United States, conceals and does not as 
soon as may be disclose and make known the same to some one of the judges or 
other persons in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined 
not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisioned not more than three years, or 
both. 
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §l46, 35 Stat. 1114. 
76. Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1939). 
77. 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1966). 
78. The court commented, however, that .. [w Jere this a defense, there seldom could be a 
conviction." 1d. at 411. 
79.1d .. 
80. 18 U.S.C. 04 (1970). 
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1970S 1 were thought to have settled the point that both the act of 
concealment of a felony and the omission to make it known must be 
proved to support conviction of misprision. It would follow that one 
who failed to report a known felony, but who took no action to 
conceal it, would not be guilty of misprision under the federal 
statute.s 2 There is reason to believe that Congress specifically intended 
this to be so.s 3 Furthermore, this position appeals to one's sense of 
fairness and distaste for prosecution of mere bystanders. 
But the converse of such events has a possible result not so satisfac-
tory. That is, if a person willfully destroyed evidence of a felony and 
then reported the felony to the federal authorities (to conceal his own 
involvement, for example), the report should not be a defense to 
prosecution for the destruction of evidence; yet the destruction alone 
would not be a misprision as the statute has been interpreted, above. 
A willfull destruction of evidence of a felony should be an obstruc-
tion of justice;s 4 but apparently is not. S 5 Neither would such a 
wrongdoer be a conspirator, without some association with the princi-
pal. S 6 Literally, one who willfully and knowingly destroys or conceals 
evidence of a felony, "assists the offender in order to hinder ... his 
apprehension, trial or punishment"S 7 and therefore should be punish-
able as an accessory after the fact,S S although there seems to be some 
81. Sullivan v. United States. 411 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. King. 402 F.2d 
694 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Norman. 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968); Lancey v. 
United States. 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 385 U.S. 922 (1966); United States v. 
Thornton. 178 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Neal v. United States. 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 
1939). cert. denied. 312 U.S. 679 (1941); Bratton v. United States. 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 
1934); United States v. Farrar. 38 F.2d 515 (D. Mass.). affd. 281 U.S. 624 (1930). 
82. Although mere failure to report was sufficient for conviction of misprision at common law 
(Sykes v. Director of Put. Prosecutions. (1961)3 All E.R. 33 (H.L.». "what a federal 
statute does not make criminal is not an offense against the United States." United 
States v. Perlstein. 126 F.2d 789.802 (3d Cir. 1942) (dissenting opinion). 
83. The common law definition of the offense consisted only ofthe elements of knowledge and 
failure to disclose. Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions. [1961] 3 All E.R 33 (H.L.). 
while the federal misprision statute as enacted in 1790 added the phrase "conceal and." 
Act of April 13. 1790. ch. 9. §6. 1 Stat. 113. In Bratton v. United States. 73 F.2d 795. 797 
(lOth Cir. 1934). the court said that "we must assume that Congress intended something 
by the use of the words 'conceal and ... • 
84. 18 U.S.C. §§1501-09 (1970). 
85. 18 U.S.C. §§1501-04 (1970) involve assaults upon people. or obstructing. influencing or 
injuring people. not evidence; id. §1507 applies to picketing and parading; id. §1508 to 
spying on grand juries; id. §§1505. 1509-10 apply to the use of force. threats or improper 
persuasion to influence people; id. §1511 to conspiracy; id. §1505 pertains to a "civil 
investigative demand . . . made under the" Antitrust Civil Process Act or the act 
pertaining to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations; id. §1506 to judicial 
documents. 
86. See 18 U.S.C. §371 (1970). 
87. 18 U.S.C. §3 (1970). 
88. Although no case has been found which holds that one who knowingly conceals or destroys 
evidence of a felony is an accessory after the fact thereto. see United States v. Daddano. 
432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir: 1970). intimidation of witnesses is both misprision and accessory 
after the fact; Cleaver v. United States. 238 F.2d 766. 770 (lOth Cir. 1956). conviction of 
conspiracy reversed because his admission that defendant helped dispose of stolen goods 
"show [s] only that he is an accessory after the fact;" Neal v. United States. 102 F.2d 643 
(8th. Cir. 1939). cert. denied. 312 U.S. 679 (l941). conviction of misprision and accessory 
after the fact reversed for failure to prove that what was concealed was part of the fruits of 
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confusion on the point.S 9 
It is a cliche that hard cases make bad law. Sometimes, judicial desire 
to affirm a conviction has a like result. In United States u. Daddano,9 0 
the court recognized that the Fifth Amendment relieved the defendant 
of the statutory duty to report the felony involved, but said that "the 
statute does not purport to punish one solely for failure to report facts 
which he has a reasonable fear might lead to his conviction of 
crime,"91 and affirmed the conviction for misprision on the ground 
that, "the offense of misprision ... consists of an act of concealment in 
addition to failure to discloSe.,,9 2 With all respect, it seems equally 
clear that the statute does not purport to punish one solely for an act 
of concealment.93 Just as possible self-incrimination is a defense to 
punishment for contempt in failing to answer questions,9 4 so should it 
be also a defense to prosecution for failure to report a felony.9 5 
Therefore, the conviction should have been reversed. 
In support of the court's position in Daddano, it could be argued 
that although a person who fails to disclose a felony in which he might 
be implicated is protected from punishment by the Fifth Amendment, 
nevertheless, he has failed to make known the felony. When his failure 
to make known the felony is joined by his act of concealment, the 
required elements of federal misprision are satisfied. It is submitted that 
this argument is specious in that Congress has expressly required a 
failure to make known as an element of misprision and that upholding a 
conviction for either a concealment or a nondisclosure would unconsti-
tutionally amend the statute by judicial fiat. Consequently, Daddano 
should be overruled. . 
II. RELATED CRIMES COMPARED 
Acce880ry After the Fact 
The superficial similarity of misprision to the crime of the accessory 
after the fact, and the existence of some confusion in the cases,96 
a felony; Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483, 489 (1Oth Cir. 1935), conviction of 
conspiracy affirmed on evidence that defendant knowingly received and exchanged 
ransom money on the ground that by the agreement to commit "such acts as accessories 
after the fact, they thereby became parties to the conspiracy .... " 
89. See pp. 72-73 infra. 
90. 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
91. [d. at 1125. 
92. [d. 
93. The elements of the offense under the statute are two: There must be (1) a 
concealment of something such as suppression of the evidence or other positive act 
and (2) a failure to disclose. Proof of one of the elements only, and not of both, is 
not sufficient to support a conviction. 
United States v. Neal, 102 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1939). In a later reversal of a misprision 
conviction, it was said: 
Our analysis of the facts indicates [the defendant's J simultaneous involvement 
in the crime at the moment when her duty to notify could have arisen. But at that 
point we have a collision with the Fifth Amendment and the latter must prevail. 
United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1971). 
94. Grudin v. United States, 198 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953). 
95. United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968). . 
96. For example, one who harbored a known fugitive felon was convicted of being an 
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compels comparison. It is provided that "[w]hoever, knowing that an 
offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, 
comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his 
apprehension, trial, or punishment, is an accessory after the fact."9 7 
The dichotomy between this and misprision is that an accessory after 
the fact is one who assists the offender himself while a misprisioner is 
one who conceals the felony itself. This is the primary distinction 
between the two offenses as found in the common law.98 
It is apparent that 'secretly harboring the felon or concealing the 
fruits of the felony "assists the offender" and when accomplished, "in 
order to hinder or prevent his apprehension," the requirements of both 
statutes are met. Nevertheless, misprision and accessory after the fact 
have been held to be discrete offenses on the ground that the principal 
element of each (concealment of the felony; assisting the felon) is not a 
required element of the other.99 Consequently, one may be separately 
punished under each statute for a single act of secretly harboring a 
known felon or concealing evidence of the felony if one intends 
thereby to hinder or prevent his principal's apprehension, trial or 
punishment. 1 00 (One wonders if this could be "the logic of an accurate 
mind overtasked.")l 0 1 
Harboring Fugitive Felon 
Fugitives from justice may be classified as persons suspected of 
crimes and sought for investigation, persons sought under warrant or 
other process (before or after conviction), and escaped prisoners. Per-
sons who knowingly harbor or conceal fugitives of the latter two 
categories are subject to prosecution. 1 0 2 Persons harboring a fugitive in 
any of these categories would be guilty of misprision, if the person 
harbored or concealed was known by them to be guilty of a felony, 1 0 3 
accessory after the fact, Orlando v. United States, 377 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1967), while 
another was convicted of misprision, Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); one who knowingly received and disposed of the 
proceeds of a felony was convicted of misprision, Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556 
(10th Cir. 1969), while another was convicted of conspiracy to commit the felony on the 
ground that he was an accessory after the fact, Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 757 (1935). 
97. 18 U.S.C. §3 (1970). 
98. Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [19611 3 All E.R. 33, 40 (H.L.). 
99. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Neal v. United States, 
102 F.2d 643,645-46 (8th Cir. 1939), where the court's analysis of the elements of the two 
offenses reveals that the only difference is that misprision requires "that he failed to 
notify the authorities" while the accessory after the fact statute contains no such element. 
At first blush it seems unlikely that an accessory after the fact could be one who notified 
the authorities; but then it is conceivable that reporting the crime with further false, 
information might well assist the concealed felon to escape immediate apprehension. 
Thus, again it is possible to be an accessory after a felony without being guilty of 
misprision of the felony. 
100. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
101. O. W. HOLMES, SR., THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 40 (Am. Cent. ed. 1957). 
102. 18 U.S.C.§§1071-72 (1970). 
103. Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966), where' 
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and would be subject to punishment by consecutive sentences for the 
two violations based upon the single act of harboring or concealing the 
fugitive.' 04 Furthermore, since such knowing harboring or concealing 
of a fugitive felon would also receive, relieve, comfort or assist the 
offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punish-
ment, a third consecutive sentence could be imposed under the section 
punishing an accessory after the fact,' 0 5 and a fourth for con-
spiracy. ' 0 6 
Blackmail 
It is provided that" [w] hoever shall, under a threat of informing, or 
as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of 
the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable 
thing, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.'" 0 7 Clearly, a mis-
prision committed for money is also blackmail under this section. The 
possible confusion resulting from the overlapping of these two offenses 
has resulted in the reversal of at least one conviction.' 0 8 
Conspiracy 
The federal conspiracy statute provides that, "[i) f two or more 
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United 
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any 
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act 
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined ... or 
imprisoned ... or both.'" 0 9 When a court finds that such a conspiracy 
embraces the concealment of the fruits of the crime or of the identity 
of the conspirators (and what criminal conspiracy worthy of its salt 
would not include such objectives?), then the conspirators become 
misprisioners when anyone of them commits any act of conceal-
ment;1 10 and a misprisioner becomes thereby a member of the con-
spiracy . I I I 
harboring one known to be sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for bank robbery 
was held to be misprision (a fortiori, misprision should apply to one wanted under warrant 
or other proce88 for a felony); United Stat.es v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
104. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Bee United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 
42 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
105. 18 U.S.C. §3 (1970). 
106. See Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483 (1Oth Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 757 (1935). 
107. 18 U.S.C. 0873 (1970) . 
. 108. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934). The indictment did not specify 
whether the accused was charged with blackmail or misprision. Conviction was reversed 
on the ground that the Government failed to allege or prove an act of concealment and was 
not entitled to an affirmance on the theory that the accused had committed another 
crime (blackmail) than that for which convicted. 
109. 18 U.S.C. 0371 (1970). 
110. The act of the conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to the other 
meinbers of the conspiracy as if each had himself committed the act. Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
111. See Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 757 (1935). A 
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Obstruction of Justice 
Given the elements of misprision as hereinabove reviewed, it may 
readily be seen that the offense when committed by threatening or 
bribing felony witnesses is also an obstruction of justice under various 
statutory provisions, I I 2 all of which prescribe punishment for anyone 
who attempts to influence witnesses or prevent the communication of 
information to criminal investigators. 
It has been held that there is no obstruction of justice as defined by 
the foregoing statutes until, at the earliest, a criminal complaint has 
been filed. I 13 The point has been contested. I 14 Nevertheless, even if 
so held, the conclusion would remain that while every obstruction of 
justice is not a misprision, any misprision consisting of the suppression 
of evidence as defined above, occurring after an official proceeding had 
commenced, would also be a violation of one of the foregoing sections. 
conspiracy to kidnap and to dispose of the ransom in such a way that it could not be 
traced was executed, the present defendants having knowingly received part of the 
ransom and exchanged it for a bank cashier's check. The court held that they were 
accessories after the fact and therefore part of the conspiracy. Their act of knowingly 
receiving and trying to conceal the ransom would also be a misprision. See pp. 59-61 supra. 
112. Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or com-
munication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in" any 
court of the United States or before any United States magistrate or other 
committing magistrate ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. §1503 (1970). 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or com-
munication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any 
proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States. or in 
connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any 
committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or .... 
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole 
or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the 
Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any 
place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any 
documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such 
proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or 
the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or 
investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any 
joint committee of the Congress-
ShaH be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
Id. §1505. 
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery, misrepresentation, 
intimidation, or force or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the 
communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the 
United States by any person to a criminal investigator. . . " 
Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
Id. §1510. 
113. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893). 
114. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 678 (1942). 
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III. DEFENSES 
75 
The obvious defenses potentially available to one charged with mis-
prision of a federal felony are (1) the principal's offense was not a 
felony,115 (2) the defendant did not know that the principal's offense 
was a felony,11 6 (3) the defendant did not conceal anything relevant to 
the felony, I I 7 (4) the defendant either reported the offense or had a 
constitutional right to refrain from doing SO,1 I 8 and (5) the defendant 
was prevented from reporting the offense by reasonable fear of immedi-
ate harm if he tried to do SO.1 I 9 
Other defenses which are less certainly available include the follow-
ing. . 
Fear of Libel Suit 
Fear of prosecution for libel or slander should be no excuse for a 
failure to report by one who had the requisite knowledge,! 20 because 
such basis for the report and the statutory duty to report! 2! would 
eliminate the element of malice required for a successful libel prosecu-
tion.1 22 
On the other hand, the fear of prosecution or a lawsuit for libel or 
slander could be very real in the mind of one unsure of the accuracy of 
his information. I 23 The knowledge that Ormsby's libel conviction was 
based upon a finding that he in fact acted maliciously would be small 
comfort to one impaled on the dilemma of possible prosecution for 
misprisic;m if he did not report and for libel if he did. The best legal 
advice available could do no more than speculate whether a judge or 
jury in the latter case would agree that the defendant had enough 
information to be acting in good faith. 
The dilemma is probably not capable of resolution with perfect 
justice to the individual and to society. If one had actual knowledge to 
a certainty that a felony had been committed, then the truth of his 
115. See pp. 54-56 supra. 
116. See p. 57 supra. 
117. See pp. 59-61 supra. 
118. See p. 65 supra. 
119. See p. 63 supra. 
120. See pp. 56-58 supra. 
121. See note 13 supra. 
122. In Ormsby v. United States, 273 F. 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1921), the court upheld an 
indictment for libel over the defendant's contention that it was void as alleging the 
performance of a statutory duty (to report a felony), on the ground that the !ndictment 
alleged that "the libelous words charged were not only false ... but were uttered with the 
unlawful and malicious intention to vilify, defame, scandalize, and disgrace the subject of 
the publication." 
123. The fear of prosecution-regardless of the probability of acquittal-is a judicially 
recogriized basis for the Constitutional right to refrain from giving potentially self-
incriminating information to the government. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 
(1955); United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968). The same principle would 
seem to apply to a misprisioner, whose defense was fear of prosecution for libel or slander. 
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report should be a defense to libel; but it would be no guarantee that 
the principal would not be acquitted and sue him. If his information 
were no more than uncorroborated hearsay, he would have no duty to 
report it and fear of a libel suit should be a defense to prosecution for 
misprision; but would be no guarantee that he would not be charged 
with misprision. 
The ground between these two extremes, therefore, can but support 
different degrees of potential liability, calling for the exercise of an 
attorney's professional judgment as to the relatively safer alternative. 
No better solution than that is apparent, so long as the report of 
felonious misconduct and the failure to report same are both subject to 
punitive consequences. 
In terspousal Privilege 
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in 
material part, that "[t]he admissibility of evidence and the competency 
and privileges of witnesses shall be governed ... by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience." 
The Supreme Court of the United States long ago accepted, "in the 
light of reason and experience," the modified common law rule that, 
"the wife is not competent, except in cases of violence upon her 
person, directly to criminate her husband; or to disclose that which she 
has learned from him in their confidential intercourse.'" 2 4 That ruling 
has been affirmed more than once. r 2 5 
Since the basis for the rule with respect to competence to testify is 
"the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the 
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disad-
vantages to the administration of justice which the privilege en-
tails,"1 2 6 it would seem clearly to apply to a wife (and, indeed, a 
husband as well) who failed to report the spouse's felony, raising a bar 
to prosecution for misprision. However, in the only case found in which 
the point was raised, the defendant failed to establish the marital 
relationship;' 2 7 and in another case in which a wife was prosecuted for 
misprision of a felony in which her husband was involved, the point was 
apparently not raised at all. I 2 8 
Double Jeopardy 
"No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb .... " says the Fifth Amendment of the 
124. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 222 (1839). 
125. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
126. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). 
127. Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966). 
128. Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1969). 
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United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has announced that, "[ 0] ur minds rebel against permitting the same 
sovereignty to punish an accused twice for the same offense. "I 29 Yet 
the overlapping identity of the elements of misprision and of other 
federal offenses! 30 permits multiple prosecutions for what is in fact a 
single act by a single defendant with a single purpose and consequence. 
For example, a knowing concealment of evidence or fruits of a 
felony would necessarily assist the felon to avoid apprehension, trial or 
punishment. If the person concealing the evidence also failed to report 
the felony he would be simultaneously in violation of the misprision 
statute' 3' and of the section providing punishment for an accessory 
after the fact.' 3 2 Other examples are set out hereinabove. I 3 3 
It seems to be settled that consecutive sentences may be imposed for 
any combination of misprision and the other offenses compared herein, 
even if the defendant perpetrated but a single act.' 34 It is submitted 
that those decisions should be over-ruled and that, regardless of the 
validity of the constitutional argument, Congress should be "unable to 
believe such a second [and third and fourth] punishment for one crime 
is either fair or consistent with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against double jeopardy,'" 3 5 and should therefore amend the mis-
prision statute to prevent this result. 
Violation of Due Process 
"N 0 person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law," says the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Volumes have been written on the meaning of "due 
process of law" and a reevaluation thereof is beyond the scope of this 
article, so it is hoped that a consensus can be assembled arounq the 
proposition that due process includes the concept of fundamental 
fairness in the process of trying out the guilt or innocence of one 
accused of a crime. 
A succinct statement of what this means in terms of an indictment is 
found in Evans v. United States;' 36 
Even in the cases of misdemeanors, the indictment must be 
free from all ambiguity, and leave no doubt in the minds of the 
accused and the court of the exact offense intended to be 
129. Louisiana ex rei Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 452 (1947). 
130. See pp. 65-68 supra. 
131. 18 U.S.C. §4 (1970). 
132. Id. §3. 
133. See pp. 66-68 supra. 
13,4. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), where three Justices dissented. The decision is 
criticized in Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 303-()4 (1965). See also United 
States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
135. Ashcraft v. United States, 361 U.S. 925 (1959) (dissent to denial of certiorari). 
136. 153 U.S. 584,587 (1894). 
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charged, not only that the fonner may know what he is called 
upon to meet, but that, upon a plea of fonner acquittal or 
conviction, the record may show with accuracy the exact of-
fense to which the plea relates. 
In view of the overlapping of the elements of misprision with those 
of similar crimes, 1 3 7 to 'the extent that serious double jeopardy ques-
tions are raised, 1 38 it is difficult to see how most misprision indict-
ments escape constitutional challenge on this ground. But only one case 
has been found in which the point was raised (and in that it was 
successful V 3 9 . 
It· can only be concluded that the rarity of constitutional attack on 
misprision indictments is due in part to the rarity of misprision prosecu-
tions and in part to the failure of defense counsel to see the innate 
ambiguity of a misprision indictment, when compared with the tenns in 
which related offensesl 4 0 are necessarily charged. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the foregoing discussion of the 
federal crime of misprision are the following criticisms of it: 
(1) the federal misprision statute is either selectively or capriciously 
enforced and then, only in a few federal districts, thus violating our 
constitutional concept that all are equal under the law;l 4 1 
(2) the limitation of the offense to concealment of felonies seriously 
impairs its effectiveness in turning up serious crimes and creates a 
serious danger of violating the constitutional concept of due process; 
(3) the ambiguity of the phrase in the misprision statute, "having 
knowledge of the actual commission of a felony," creates problems of 
statutory interpretation which unduly hamper effective enforcement 
and open technical loopholes which competent defense counsel are ever 
alert to push their clients through; , 
(4) the failure of the misprision statute clearly to include attempted 
concealment of a federal felony as a punishable offense leaves an escape 
route potentially available to every apprehended misprisioner; 
137, See pp. 65-68 supra. 
138. See pp. 70-71 supra. 
139. Bratton v. United States. 73 F.2d 795 (lOth Cir. 1934). Defendant blackmajled a felon to 
conceal and not report the felony. The indictment alleged those facts. His conviction of 
misprision was reversed for the ambiguity in the indictment as to whether it charged 
misprision or blackmail. The court said: 
If the indictment is under [the misprision statute J. the averment of a consideration 
is surplusage .... If the indictment alleges two distinct offenses. it is duplici-
tous .... If the indictment leaves the defendant in fair doubt as to the offense 
charged. it fails to meet the test that an indictment should "leave no doubt in the 
minds of the accused and'the court of the exact offense intended to be charged." 
73 F.2d at 797. 
140. See pp. 65-68 supra. 
141. See Berra v. United States. 351 U.S. 131. 138-40 (1956) (Black. J. dissenting); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356. 373-74 (1886); United States v. Falk. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); 
Hutcherson v. United States. 345 F.2d 964.972 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, J. dissenting). 
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(5) exactly what is an act of concealment, within the meaning of 
misprision, has yet to be defined; that provided herein being both 
unofficial and highly speculative, as well as including acts which are 
more properly charged as offenses other than misprision; 
(6) what one may do to avoid punishment for failure to make known 
a felony is not clear, nor is whether an ineffective attempt will bar 
conviction; whether there is strict liability for failure to make known 
has not been decided and, if strict liability is not imposed, what 
circumstances would excuse the failure to make known are presently 
uncertain; 
(7) although the statute seems clearly to require both an act of 
concealment and an omission to report as prerequisite to guilt, there is 
authority to the contrary;l 42 and both interpretations create substan-
tial problems, respectively, of enforcement and of due process; 
(8) the misprision statute as so far interpreted encourages multiple 
prosecutions of' a singte defendant for a single act of misprision when 
that act is also a related federal crime and thereby, arguably, violates 
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 
In the face of the foregoing problems of interpretation, enforcement 
and constitutional validity of the federal misprision statute, it is sub-
mitted that cosmetic surgery would be inadequate and that excisement 
from the criminal code is indicated. At the least, there should be a 
reevaluation of this ancient crime to determine whether it still serves its 
historic purpose of encouraging citizen participation in law enforce-
ment. 
142. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). 
